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BIG FOUR PREMIUMS IN THE SPANISH AUDIT MARKET AND MONOPOLY POWER 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study seeks to investigate the effect of market competition as a moderator factor of Big 
Four fee premiums. Unlike previous studies, we measure market competition by structural 
variables, such as market concentration or entry barriers, and dynamic variables of market 
mobility, based on variations in the market shares of audit firms. Using a sample of Spanish 
non-financial listed companies over the years 2003–2010, we find that Big Four premiums are 
not explained by the level of competition within the market. Our findings are opposed to those 
of academics and regulators who consider that Big Four auditors earn higher fees through the 
exercise of market power. These results reinforce the idea that Big Four premiums are driven 
by audit firms’ reputation as providers of quality-differentiated audit services. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of the present study is to determine whether the level of market competition 
affects the ability of Big Four accounting firms to obtain fee premiums. To the extent that these 
fee premiums vary with the level of competition, evidence will be obtained that the exercise of 
market power is the origin of these premiums. 
As Hay and Knechel (2017) highlight, the Big N audit firm premium is an important area 
in auditing research because it relates to competition and audit quality that are of concern to 
regulators, auditors, and audit clients. In this regard, the economic theory of imperfect markets 
suggests that certain features of a market, such as the number of relevant suppliers, their 
market shares, and the existence of entry barriers, create specific conditions for the leading 
companies to develop certain anti-competitive behaviors. One example is pricing above 
competitive levels—i.e., the structure of the market enables market power.1 In relation to this 
concern, a significant number of studies by regulatory bodies around the world (GAO, 
Government Accountability Office 2003, 2008; FRC, Financial Reporting Council 2009; 
European Commission 2010; Competition Commission 2013; European Parliament 2014a, 
2014b) have highlighted the absence of competitive dynamics in the market, as well as certain 
possible negative effects that may occur. In particular, there is the possibility for market-
leading firms to obtain monopoly rents by imposing higher prices than those that would be 
charged in a competitive market.  
                                                 
1 Regarding the audit market, several studies have demonstrated the existence of high and growing 
concentration, and entry barriers, particularly in certain segments of the market (Dopuch and Simunic 
1980; Danos and Eichenseher 1986; Pong 1999; Quick and Wolz 1999; Gramling and Stone 2001; 
Beattie, Goodacre, and Fearnley 2003; Francis, Richelt, and Wang 2005; Ferguson, Francis, and Stokes 
2006; Hamilton, Li, and Stokes 2008; Abidin, Beattie, and Goodacre 2010). Based on the large body of 
evidence revealed by some of these studies, Beattie and Fearnley (1995) considered that the audit 
market is a narrow oligopoly, with a market structure characterized by the control exerted by 
multinational companies, stable market shares, and entry barriers. These aspects can adversely affect 
the intensity of the competition. Nevertheless, empirical evidence of the positive association between 
the increase in concentration and audit fees remains unclear (Evans and Schwartz 2014; Gerakos and 
Syverson 2015; Huang, Chang, and Chiou 2016; Eshleman and Lawson 2017; Chu, Simunic, Ye, and 
Zhang 2018). 
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However, the existence of higher prices charged by the Big Four cannot be understood 
as anti-competitive behavior in all cases, given that it is equally possible that market 
participants may not consider all service providers as perfect substitutes. That is to say, the 
Big Four accounting firms can be considered more reputable and able to offer differentiated 
audit services for which auditee companies are willing to pay higher prices to obtain better 
service quality (Francis 1984; Palmrose 1986; Francis and Simon 1987; Pearson and 
Trompeter 1994; Lee 1996; Carson, Simnett, Soo, and Wright 2012).  
The implications of the two competitive arguments are different. If there is market power, 
there will be imperfect competition, leading to the loss of welfare in society, therefore requiring 
intervention by the authorities. On the other hand, if audit fee premiums are explained by the 
desire of audited companies to pay for higher service quality, there will be a competitive market 
with a differentiated demand for quality and, therefore, a different price for each quality 
(Simunic and Stein 1987). This way, the use of any measure to avoid high market control 
exerted by the Big Four accounting firms would be unnecessary, and even unjustified.  
Several studies have attempted to analyze the nature of competition in the audit market 
of various countries; the empirical evidence regarding the existence of Big N audit firm 
premium was varied. While some studies concluded that the Big Four accounting firms 
obtained higher prices than other suppliers in the market (Francis 1984; Palmrose 1986; Pong 
and Whittington 1994; Ireland and Lennox 2002; McMeeking, Peasnell, and Pope 2007; 
Huang et al. 2016; Eshleman and Lawson 2017; Chu et al. 2018), others did not find different 
prices between the Big Four and non-Big Four accounting firms (Simunic 1980; Firth 1985; 
Simon 1985; Baber, Brooks, and Ricks 1987; Simon, Teo, and Trompeter 1992; Che-Ahmad 
and Houghton 1996; Ferguson and Stokes 2002; Chaney, Jeter, and Shivakumar 2004). 
Recently, Hay and Knechel (2017), trying to reconcile these differences by applying the meta-
regression technique, found that the Big N premium is primarily a private sector phenomenon, 
and most prevalent in more recent years.  
On the other hand, with regard to those studies that found empirical evidence of the 
existence of higher prices obtained by the Big Four accounting firms, some of them inferred 
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that these higher prices were actually due to differentiation (Francis 1984; Francis and Stokes 
1986; Carson, Fargher, Simon, and Taylor 2004; Cameran 2005; Hamilton, Li, and Stokes 
2008), whereas others found that market power was the explanation for higher prices obtained 
by Big N audit firms (Chen, Ezzamel, and Gwilliam 1993; Johnson, Walwer, and Westergaard 
1995; Chen, Su, and Wu 2007). These studies infer whether the premium is the outcome of 
market power by analyzing the existence of this premium in different sub-markets based on 
client size (Simunic 1980; Francis 1984; Francis and Stokes 1986; Chen et al. 1993; Chen et 
al. 2007; Johnson et al. 1995; Gul 1999; Peel and Roberts 2003; Carson et al. 2004; Cameran 
2005; Hamilton et al. 2008). In doing so, the sub-market of large audited companies is 
considered a less competitive market, in that it is practically controlled by the Big Four 
accounting firms, while greater competition is attributed to the sub-market composed of 
smaller auditees, resulting from the presence of a greater number of active audit firms. The 
comparison of price behavior of the Big Four auditors in both market segments provided a 
basis to make inferences about the nature of price competition.2 One limitation of these studies 
is that they assume that sub-samples of small auditees are more competitive, but they do not 
directly contrast the level of market competition. In addition, these works have primarily been 
based on samples of large companies (mostly listed companies), in which even the segment 
of small auditees included large companies (Peel and Roberts 2003).  
Carson et al. (2012) were the first to provide a more direct approach on whether the ability 
of Big Four auditors to obtain audit fee premiums is affected by their ability to exercise market 
power. Specifically, they analyzed the impact on the premium of a reduction in the number of 
Big N present in the market.  
                                                 
2 For example, if Big N auditors impose higher prices than other suppliers in both market segments, it 
can be inferred that the origin of these prices is due to the fact that the Big N auditors offer a 
differentiated service, since they charge differentiation premiums regardless of the degree of control 
they have in both segments. On the other hand, if the prices charged by Big N accounting firms are 
higher than those charged by other providers in a less competitive sub-market and similar to those 
charged by the other providers in the most competitive sector, it may be possible to observe market 
power. 
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Our study seeks to broaden that of Carson et al. (2012) by examining the impact on the 
Big Four premium of the level of competition in the market. Unlike the aforementioned study, 
we use a more complete set of measures to determine the level of market competition—that 
is, two structural variables, such as concentration or entry barriers, and a dynamic variable, 
such as market mobility, based on variations in the market share of audit firms. The latter type 
of variable, unlike concentration measurements, is able to detect latent changes in the number 
of relevant companies and variations in participation. These aspects determine the underlying 
competitive process in oligopolies and provide a more realistic description of their competition 
intensity (Baldwin and Gorecki 1989; Koster, Stel, and Folkeringa 2012; Fusillo 2013). This 
new methodological approach will provide more robust evidence of the price behavior of the 
Big Four accounting firms and the nature of competition in the audit market. 
Additionally, in response to the call by Hay and Knechel (2017) that encourages continued 
research on the existence of a Big N audit firm premium in settings where there are relatively 
few research studies, we add to the competition and fee premium literature by providing 
Spanish evidence. In this line, the diversity of empirical evidence detected, from both a 
temporal and a geographical point of views, led Choi, C. Kim, J. B. Kim, and Zang (2010) to 
argue that the ability of Big Four auditors to exercise market power was largely dependent on 
the institutional features of the audit market of a country. However, most of the previous 
evidences refer to Anglo-Saxon markets. Just a few studies have considered the presence of 
fee premiums in the era of the Big Four audit firms in European countries, and with mixed 
findings (see Hay and Knechel 2017 for a review). Cameran (2005) is the only one that 
indirectly examines whether the origin of the premium fee is in the exercise of market power, 
using a methodology similar to that of Simunic (1980). Cameran (2005) found that in Italy, in 
the period prior to the disappearance of Arthur Andersen, the premium seemed to be attributed 
to differential reputation. Nevertheless, as the author highlights, the Italian audit market is not 
directly comparable with the market of other major European countries. In this sense, it is 
worth mentioning a series of unique characteristics of the Spanish audit market that could help 
multinational companies exercise market power more easily in the Spanish context than in 
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other markets. The market of listed companies is small in terms of both supply and demand, 
with the offer featuring a higher level of concentration than in other countries (Ruiz Barbadillo, 
Rodríguez Castro, and Biedma López 2016). Moreover, the Spanish market is less mature 
and less developed in comparison to the Anglo-Saxon market, so the Big Four may not have 
developed the historical reputation of higher quality they have acquired in the Anglo-Saxon 
environment. Hence, the Spanish case may be relevant to see how the Big Four auditors 
operate in environments with market characteristics favorable to the exercise of market power. 
 To achieve these goals, we use a sample from the audit market composed of non-
financial listed Spanish companies operating between 2003 and 2010. Our results indicate 
that, in the Spanish audit market, Big Four accounting firms receive higher fees than other 
smaller firms for their services. However, despite the characteristics of the market―such as 
high concentration―these audit fee premiums are not explained by market power exercised 
by these firms. This fact seems to suggest that the perceived effect of service differentiation 
may explain the premiums obtained by the Big Four accounting firms. This evidence is of great 
value for regulatory bodies and audit firms, due to the implications that these results have for 
the competitive behavior of audit firms. The fact that the differentiation effect of higher quality 
service has a direct impact on the establishment of fees can allow other smaller audit firms to 
focus their efforts on increasing the quality of the services provided.  
The rest of our study is structured as follows. After this introduction, in the second section, 
we review the theoretical foundations of market power and the literature on the audit market 
in order to formulate the research questions. The third section presents the methodology used, 
along with the specification of the model, the definition of variables, and the selection of the 
sample. We then present the univariate and multivariate empirical results, and other analyses. 
Finally, we present the conclusions of the study.  
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
Analysis of the nature of competition in the audit market has generated intense debate in 
academic and professional fields. The audit market has been regarded as a narrow oligopoly 
with a number of features that can affect competition intensity (Chan 1999; Abidin, Beattie, 
8 
 
and Goodacre 2010). In this regard, certain firms, specifically those known as the Big Four 
accounting firms, absorb a substantial amount of activity in the market, with relatively stable 
market shares over time and entry barriers, which are aspects that may imply a low level of 
competition. These characteristics may allow the leading firms in the market to develop certain 
anti-competitive behaviors, such as operating together to impose prices above those that 
would prevail in a competitive market (GAO 2003, 2008; Oxera 2006, 2007; FRC 2009, 2010; 
OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2009; European 
Commission 2010; UK House of Lords 2011). 
Indeed, in a market of perfect competition, the free functioning of supply and demand 
makes prices equal to marginal costs and non-dependent on the number of competitors. This 
implies that no company will be able to affect the price system and all companies will therefore 
become price accepters. However, these competitive conditions are not often in line with 
empirical observations of markets. Therefore, there is a certain level of imperfection in real 
markets, which allows leading companies to exercise market power. This power represents 
the possibility that leading companies have to jointly impose prices above marginal costs due 
to limited market competition. This fact could lead to an unjustified increase in audit costs for 
companies, loss of social welfare, and clear inefficiency in the functioning of the market. 
The empirical literature has attempted to determine not only whether leading companies 
develop market power in oligopolies but also the factors that may explain its occurrence, in 
order to develop public policies to prevent this type of anti-competitive behavior. In this sense, 
it is worth noting that the traditional theory, used for decades to explain market power, is based 
on the paradigm called structure-behavior-outcome, according to which structural 
characteristics of the market can explain the behavior of leading companies such as the 
imposition of high prices. In turn, this allows these companies to obtain greater outcomes than 
would prevail in conditions of perfect competition (i.e., monopoly rents). Within this analytical 
framework, it is therefore of particular interest to analyze the structural features of the market 
that may help companies exercise market power. In this sense, two particular features have 
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gained a great deal of attention as possible determinants of the possibility of exercising market 
power, these being the level of market concentration and the existence of entry barriers.  
The traditional theory of industrial organization suggests that market competition basically 
depends on the existence of a sufficient number of competitors which have relatively similar 
positions in the market. This fact means that no one supplier has the capacity to operate in 
the price system and become the price accepter. On the other hand, in markets where there 
is significant inequality in the size of companies—i.e., in concentrated markets—leading 
companies are aware of the strategic interdependencies occurring between them, which may 
motivate them to consider that entering into non-competition agreements—i.e., collusive 
agreements—will maximize their joint interests. In this way, concentration favors collusion and 
enables leading companies to take actions together with the purpose of imposing high prices 
in the market (Stigler 1964). Secondly, entry barriers are only certain advantages that 
companies established in the market have over any potential new entrant into the market. 
Entry barriers prevent free access to the market by imposing a number of additional costs on 
potential competitors. In this way, these barriers will help leading companies to perceive their 
position in the market as impregnable, making it easier for them to develop anti-competitive 
behavior, such as the exercise of market power (Baumol, Panzar, Willing, and Bailey 1982).3 
The Exercise of Market Power in the Audit Market: Research Question 
Analysis of the price behavior of the Big Four accounting firms allows performing a 
normative assessment of competition in a market and therefore determining whether 
measures aimed at increasing market competition are necessary (Chan 1999; Beattie, 
Goodacre, and Fearnley 2003; GAO 2003; Hackenbrack and Hogan 2005; Competition 
Commission 2013; Hay and Knechel 2017). In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the 
necessary condition that should be assessed to determine whether the Big Four auditors 
                                                 
3 In the audit market, entry barriers are associated with the existence of recognized brand names, the 
level of specialization required for auditing in certain sectors of activity, and the need for an efficient 
minimum size for audit of larger companies. 
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exercise market power is whether these companies charge their clients higher prices than 
other market suppliers for providing an audit service.  
A significant number of studies have found that the Big Four auditors do charge higher 
prices than other market suppliers (Francis 1984; Francis and Stokes 1986; Palmrose 1986; 
Simon and Francis 1988; Pong and Whittington 1994; Craswell, Francis, and Taylor 1995; 
Ezzamel, Gwilliam, and Holland 1996; Ireland and Lennox 2002; Ferguson, Francis, and 
Stokes 2003; Hay, Knechel, and Wong 2006; McMeeking et al. 2007; Ferguson and Scott 
2014; Huang et al. 2016; Eshleman and Lawson 2017; Hay and Knechel 2017; Chu, Simunic, 
Ye, and Zhang 2018), which could be considered indicative of the exercise of market power. 
However, empirical evidence has been inconclusive. Other studies have concluded that 
despite the high level of concentration in the audit market and the dominant position of the Big 
Four accounting firms, they do not charge their clients higher prices than other suppliers in the 
market (Simunic 1980; Firth 1985; Simon 1985; Baber et al. 1987; Simon et al. 1992; Che-
Ahmad and Houghton 1996; Ferguson and Stokes 2002; Chaney et al. 2004).  
Even though the accumulated empirical evidence has indicated that the audit market is 
largely concentrated at international level and there are entry barriers, as suggested by 
Baldwin and Gorecki (1989), there is no lack of competition in concentrated markets; on the 
contrary, there may be strong competition between leading companies. This fact may indicate 
that concentration and entry barriers (not in all circumstances) lead to the existence of 
collusive agreements and the exercise of market power (Pearson and Trompeter 1994; 
Willekens and Achmadi 2003; GAO 2008; Evans and Schwartz 2014; Bills and Stephens 
2016). In this sense, there is evidence that, in oligopoly markets, relatively high and increasing 
levels of concentration are not necessarily inconsistent with the existence of a vigorous 
competitive process between leading companies (Baldwin and Gorecki 1989; Davies and 
Geroski 1997).  
Therefore, the necessary and sufficient condition to conclude that the Big Four accounting 
firms exercise market power will be determined when obtaining audit fee premiums as the 
result of the dominant position enjoyed by such companies (Bandyopadhyay and Kao 2004; 
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Feldman 2006). Indeed, audited companies may consider that not all suppliers are perfect 
substitutes: i.e., they perceive that certain auditors―usually the leading companies in the 
market―offer higher quality services (Francis 1984; Palmrose 1986; Francis and Simon 1987; 
Lee 1996). Given that certain companies have more incentive to show the high quality of their 
financial information, audit firms that offer higher quality services than the average should be 
chosen even though higher prices are charged for the audit services (Dopuch and Simunic 
1982; Beatty 1989; Krishnan 2003). The Big Four accounting firms have a reputation at 
international level and a larger size in terms of logistics, human resources, and client portfolios, 
which enables higher quality services. Therefore, the audit fee premiums received are the 
outcome of the Big Four auditors obtained from the investment made to offer quality-
differentiated audit services. 
Regarding the empirical evidence used to discriminate whether higher fees charged by 
the Big Four accounting firms result from an effect of perceived differentiation or the exercise 
of market power, the results are mixed. While studies like those conducted by Chen et al. 
(1993), Johnson et al. (1995) and Chen et al. (2007) have concluded that price premiums 
obtained by multinational companies are due to the exercise of market power, other studies 
have considered that such price premiums could be explained by the differentiation of the 
service offered by such companies (Francis 1984; Francis and Stokes 1986; Carson et al. 
2004; Cameran 2005; Hamilton et al. 2008). Based on these arguments, we formulated the 
following research question: 
RQ: Do the Big Four accounting firms receive higher fees than the other companies due 
to the exercise of market power? 
METHODOLOGY 
Model and Variables 
To conduct the present study, we use the standard audit fee model that has been widely 
used in empirical literature (see Hay et al. 2006 for a review). In this model, the audit fee is a 
function of the type of auditor that performs the service, the interaction of the type of auditor 
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with the level of competition in the market, and other control variables (see Hay et al. 2006 for 
a detailed list of variables and models used), as shown below: 
AFEE = f (PREMIUM, PREMIUM*COMPETITION, CONTROL)  (1)  
where: 
AFEE is the natural logarithm of audit fees paid to the auditors (Simunic 1980; Craswell 
et al. 1995; Willekens and Achmadi 2003; Carson, Redmayne, and Liao 2014). 
PREMIUM is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when the company is audited by 
one of the Big Four accounting firms. If the company is not audited by a Big Four firm, the 
variable will receive a value of 0. If this variable is significant and has a positive sign, it will 
allow inferring that audit firms obtain premiums when they are one of the Big Four accounting 
firms. 
COMPETITION is a set of variables that measure the intensity of competition in the audit 
market. In the present study, we used three alternative measures of the level of competition, 
namely the level of concentration, the existence of entry barriers, and the variation in market 
shares. As for the level of concentration, it is measured through the four-firm concentration 
ratio (C4), representing the sum of the market shares of the four major international companies 
per year and activity sector (Moizer and Turley 1987; Willekens and Achmadi 2003; Abidin et 
al. 2010). In this respect, the traditional theory of oligopoly has indicated that the level of 
competition in a market is inversely related to the level of concentration that may exist in it.4  
In addition, to measure the existence of entry barriers5 in the market, we use the number 
of suppliers per year in each sector of activity (SUPPLIERS) (Abidin et al. 2010). Markets with 
greater entry barriers will be characterized by fewer audit firms, which will allow greater 
interdependence between the companies that dominate the market and therefore the exercise 
                                                 
4 Indeed, concentration is just the distribution of the service offer and indirectly reveals the smaller 
number of relevant companies and the greater interdependence between them, so that concentration 
could facilitate collusion and hence the exercise of market power. 
5As various studies have suggested, entry barriers in the audit market may be due to the level of 
specialization required in certain sectors of activity, the reputation of certain companies, the difficulty 
in obtaining the necessary size or capacity to cope with the audit of certain companies, etc. 
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of market power. On the other hand, in markets where there are no strong entry barriers, the 
number of audit firms will be higher, as will the existence of new entrants, so that the 
establishment of collusive agreements to impose high prices will not be feasible. 
Regarding the level of competition, we include absolute variation in market shares 
(MOBILITY), calculated as the sum of the absolute value of the changes in market share of 
companies by sector of activity over time (Sakakibara and Porter 2001). The use of market 
mobility measures, based on market share variations, provides observable indicators of the 
competitive process dynamics through which the competitive behavior and rivalry between 
leading companies can be inferred in a more accurate manner (Matraves and Rondi 2007; 
Sutton 2007). In fact, given the difficulty that colluding companies have in obtaining 
agreements and maintaining coordinated and joint action, they can reasonably hope to 
maintain their shares as constant over time (Shepherd 1970). In this way, a high absolute 
variation in market shares would reveal a vigorous competitive process occurring between 
companies, which will cause lower ability to impose higher audit prices through the exercise 
of market power. 
PREMIUM*COMPETITION represents the interaction between the level of competition in 
the market and the fact of being one of the Big Four accounting firms. This coefficient will allow 
us to answer our research question, showing whether the prices charged by the Big Four 
accounting firms were higher when the level of competition in the market was low; that is, it 
will highlight the ability to collude and exercise market power. 
CONTROL. As control variables, we considered on the one hand client attributes in terms 
of size (LTA), audit firms’ complexity (SUBSIDIARIES, FOREIGN_OP), and audit risk (NPTA, 
LIQ, TDTA, RECTA, INVTA, LOSS). These variables have been widely used in previous 
studies (Palmrose 1986; Craswell et al. 1995; Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy, and 
Raghunandan 2003; Casterella, Francis, Lewis, and Walker 2004; Choi et al. 2010). On the 
other hand, we considered the attributes of the auditors and audit assignments (NEW, 
OPINION) (Hay 2013). Finally, we included the variables INDUSTRY (Wang and Chui 2015) 
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and YEAR to control the possible effects of the type of activity sector and the temporality of 
the data. The set of control variables and the expected signs are summarized in Table 1.  
(INSERT TABLE 1) 
Sample 
The sample used in the present study is composed of non-financial listed Spanish 
companies. The information was obtained from public records of the National Securities 
Market Commission (CNMV) from 2002 to 2010. Taking into account that two years in a row 
should be compared to calculate the variation of shares, the resulting sample had a time 
horizon of eight years, from 2003 to 2010. The choice of this sample and period of time was 
based on various factors. Firstly, we only had information about audit fees of listed companies 
since 2002 (Moizer and Turley 1987). Secondly, due to the increased likelihood of obtaining 
the necessary data, listed companies were used in previous Spanish and international studies; 
as a result, the sample used in the present study allowed comparisons with previous studies. 
Finally, the sample is small in quantitative terms but not in qualitative terms, given the social 
and economic importance of these companies for the Spanish economy. 
Finally, once we excluded those observations for which we could not obtain information, 
the sample is composed of 1,006 observations (audited companies/year). Table 2 presents 
the information about the number of companies audited throughout the period assessed, 
classified according to their sector of activity.6 In order to define each sector, we have used 
the sectoral classification of the Madrid Stock Exchange (13 sectors). 
(INSERT TABLE 2) 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics  
                                                 
6 In order to assess the competition in the audit market, it is necessary to have several independent 
markets providing the same service—i.e., enough competition variability. In this regard, several studies 
have highlighted that the competition is not homogeneous among the industries in which the audited 
entity operates (Danos and Eichenseher 1986; Hogan and Jeter 1999; Gramling and Stone 2001). 
Therefore, each industrial group constitutes a market segment that can be considered as the relevant 
audit market in which auditors compete (Chu et al. 2018). 
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Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample. As can be seen, the average audit 
fee for the audit market of listed Spanish companies is 193,603.30€ per client.  
(INSERT TABLE 3) 
As regards the descriptors of experimental variables, the average PREMIUM is 0.79—
i.e., close to 1. This result indicates that most of the companies in the sample have been 
audited by one of the Big Four accounting firms. There is high concentration (C4), with an 
average level of 93 percent, ranging from market segments exclusively audited by the Big 
Four accounting firms to other markets with a concentration of 62 percent. The average 
number of market suppliers (SUPPLIERS) is around 6.5, with a minimum of two and a 
maximum of 18 suppliers in a market. Therefore, while some markets exhibit strong entry 
barriers, others have a high number of suppliers, which reduces the possibilities for market 
leaders to collude. As for absolute variation in market shares (MOBILITY), the average 
variation is 23 percent, showing wide dispersion.  
Table 4 shows the average values of the concentration level, number of suppliers, 
absolute variation in market shares, and audit fees of all the sub-markets into which the 
sample has been divided. In light of these results, there are differences in the average values 
of these indicators of competition at the sectoral level, as well as in the amount of audit fees 
invoiced. These differences were corroborated by performing a nonparametric variance test 
for each variable. The test indicated that the level of competitive intensity, and therefore the 
possible existence of collusive agreements that allowed the exercise of market power, are not 
similar in the different sectors of activity.  
With respect to the data of the control variables, it can be observed that there is also great 
dispersion in the size of the companies audited (LTA). The return on assets shows a positive 
average value, as is the case for LIQ and leverage (TDTA). The variables RECTA and INVTA 
exhibit positive average values. On the other hand, the variable SUBSIDIARIES exhibits wide 
dispersion, some companies having no subsidiary. Regarding the categorical variables, it can 
be observed that the variable LOSS has a low average value, so the largest percentage of 
companies do not suffer losses. The variables NEW and OPINION also exhibit a low average 
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value. NEW, which takes a value of 1 when the client is new to the auditors, has an average 
value of almost zero, indicating that the audited companies do not generally change audit firms 
easily. The fact that the variable OPINION has an average value close to zero indicates that, 
in most cases, the audit reports are clean. Finally, the variable FOREIGN_OP exhibits an 
average value above 0.5, which indicates that there is a greater percentage of companies that 
operate abroad in comparison to those that only operate in the country. 
(INSERT TABLE 4) 
Table 5 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between the dependent variable 
(AFEE) and the explanatory variables. As can be seen, audit fees are positively and 
significantly correlated with being a Big Four accounting firm (PREMIUM), in line with the 
existence of premiums for being one of the four international companies. Likewise, the audit 
fees are positive and significantly correlated with the level of market concentration (C4), 
indicating that in the more concentrated markets the intervening companies charge higher 
prices than when the markets exhibit less concentration. Similarly, considering the possibility 
of exercising market power, the level of fees is negative and significantly correlated with the 
number of suppliers in the market (SUPPLIERS). However, there is no significant relationship 
between the variability of market shares (MOBILITY), as a dynamic measure of competition, 
and the fees earned by the firms. 
With regard to the control variables, the level of fees charged for audit services is positive 
and significantly correlated with the size of the audited companies (LTA), the level of 
indebtedness (TDTA), the book value of accounts receivable (RECTA), the existence of 
foreign operations (FOREIGN_OP), and the number of subsidiaries (SUBSIDIARIES), and 
negatively and significantly correlated with the book value of total assets (INVTA) and the fact 
that the auditors are new (NEW).  
(INSERT TABLE 5) 
Regression Analysis 
Table 6 shows the results of the linear regression models that have been estimated along 
with different goodness-of-fit measures. Statistical t values are adjusted with robust standard 
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errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and considering clusters at company level (Choi et al. 
2010). In addition, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is calculated for all regressions. Based on 
the values obtained, our results are unlikely to be affected by collinearity problems (Gujarati 
and Porter 2010, 340). F-statistics indicate that all models are significant. The goodness-of-fit 
of all models, measured by the coefficient of determination, is in line with the explanatory 
capacity exhibited by the models proposed in previous studies (see Hay 2013), suggesting 
that our models explain a significant proportion of the variations in audit prices. 
 The first column illustrates the base model, only including the variable PREMIUM, in 
order to determine whether the Big Four accounting firms charge higher prices than other 
suppliers in the audit market, which is a necessary condition to analyze the price behavior of 
multinational companies based on the level of market competition. The second, third, and 
fourth columns illustrate the interactions between each term of competition in the market and 
the fact of being one of the Big Four accounting firms. Finally, the fifth column illustrates the 
three terms of interaction together. As mentioned above, these terms of interaction will show 
whether possible premiums earned by Big Four accounting firms are affected by the level of 
competition in the market. 
(INSERT TABLE 6) 
As can be seen in Table 6, once other determinant fee factors (such as client size, audit 
complexity, and client risk) are controlled, the Big Four auditors obtain higher fees than other 
providers in the market, which is derived from the statistical significance of the variable 
PREMIUM in all models.  
Interaction is not significant in any model in terms of competition level due to concentration 
(PREMIUM*C4), entry barriers (PREMIUM*SUPPLIERS), market mobility 
(PREMIUM*MOBILITY), or the combined effect of the various competition measures (column 
5). The audit fee premiums of the Big Four accounting firms are not affected by the level of 
market competition. From a regulatory point of view, and taking into account the factors 
mentioned above, highly concentrated markets, with a small number of suppliers due to the 
existence of strong entry barriers and greater stability of market shares, favor the leading 
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companies to obtain cooperation agreements to jointly impose higher prices than those 
charged under perfect competition. However, the fact that the prices charged by the Big Four 
auditors are not influenced by competition indicates that these auditors do not exercise market 
power in the Spanish audit market.  
On the other hand, the fact that the variable PREMIUM remains positive and at the one 
percent significance level in all models indicates that audit fee premiums obtained by these 
companies could be explained by considering that the users of services perceive that these 
companies are offering higher quality-differentiated audit services that requires the payment 
of higher prices. 
The control variables—i.e., the size of the audited company (LTA), the book value of 
accounts receivable in proportion to total assets (RECTA), and whether the company carries 
out foreign operations (FOREIGN_OP)—indicate that there is a positive and significant 
relationship with the level of fees paid for audit services. On the other hand, the higher the 
return on assets (NPTA), the higher the level of indebtedness (TDTA). In addition, when the 
client is new to the auditor (NEW), the audit fees are smaller, which represents a significant 
relationship. 
Robustness Tests 
Alternative Specification of Competition 
To rule out that the results may have been affected by the variables chosen to measure 
competition, we have repeated the analyses of Table 6 using alternative measures of the level 
of market concentration, the existence of entry barriers, and mobility. 
Concentration has been measured using the Herfindahl index (Minyard and Tabor 1991; 
Willekens and Achmadi 2003; Boone, Khurana, and Raman 2012; Eshleman and Lawson 
2017; Chu et al. 2018). This index can reach values between 0 and 1. A value of 0 means that 
the concentration is minimal (the market is spread more or less equally), and a value of 1 
means that the market is controlled by a single company. The results contained in Table 7 
(column 6) indicate that the Big Four accounting firms charged higher fees than other auditors 
(PREMIUM is positive and at the one percent significance level). However, these audit fee 
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premiums are not affected by the level of market concentration (PREMIUM*H), which confirms 
the robustness of the evidence mentioned above. 
(INSERT TABLE 7) 
Minimum efficient market size (MINSIZE) has been used as one of the entry barriers: not 
all auditors have the resources to provide audit services to companies of a certain size, which 
is a natural barrier to market entry. This measure has been calculated as the average natural 
logarithm of the total assets of audited companies per year and industry. Therefore, the higher 
the value, the greater the entry barriers and greater the likelihood of prices being affected by 
collusive agreements. In addition, as can be seen in column 7, the minimum efficient market 
size does not influence the premiums obtained by the Big Four accounting firms 
(PREMIUM*MINSIZE). 
Finally, the Gini index has been used in the industrial economy as a measure of 
competition (Dunn, Kohlbeck, and Mayhew 2011). This is a measure of dispersion which, in 
our case, is used for the market shares of different suppliers (Abidin et al. 2010; Dunn et al. 
2011; Bills and Stephens 2016). Values can vary from 0 (absolute equality between 
competitors' market shares) to 1 (strong inequality). The increase in the differentiation of 
market shares between different suppliers is considered an indicator of reduced competition 
in the market. On the other hand, if share differences are reduced, it would be a sign of greater 
competitive dynamics. The previous results remain robust in the face of this new way of 
measuring competition (column 8). 
 Alternative Estimation of the Big Four Premium 
Following the methodology proposed by Carson et al. (2012), we estimate a linear 
regression model in which the amount of premium paid by each client to each of the Big Four 
auditors depends on the level of market competition. The Big Four premiums are calculated 
as the difference between the actual audit fee paid to the Big Four audit firm (LAF) and the 
predicted audit fee that a client with an incumbent Big Four auditor would pay for a non-Big 
Four audit firm (PLAF). To obtain this predicted audit fee, model (1) is estimated for the sample 
of companies audited by non-Big Four auditors (Table 8, panel A). 
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The results shown in Table 8, panel B, evidence that the level of market competition, 
whether measured through its structure or dynamic variables, does not affect the magnitude 
of the premium received by the Big Four audit firms. 
(INSERT TABLE 8) 
Self-Selection Effect 
As an additional analysis, we have determined whether our results are affected by the 
possible endogeneity of the variable PREMIUM. As already discussed by Hamilton et al. 
(2008), several studies that used the audit fee model have indicated that the type of auditor 
may be an endogenous variable. Companies choose their auditors based on various aspects, 
such as the characteristics of the firm and the auditor, and other non-observable 
characteristics (Ireland and Lennox 2002; Chaney et al. 2004, 2005; Audousset-Coulier 2015). 
This may lead to what is known as the self-selection effect, introducing bias into the model 
estimates and therefore affecting the conclusions on premium fee audits according to the type 
of auditor.7  
We have used Heckman's correction (1979) to determine whether the results of the 
regression model are affected by the possible bias of self-selection of auditors. In a first step, 
we estimated a probit model of auditor selection8 and, based on the transformation of the 
residuals of the model, we calculated a term for bias correction—i.e., the Inverse Mills Ratio 
(IMR). In a second step, the models illustrated in Table 6 were reevaluated, including IMR as 
an independent variable.  
                                                 
7For a further explanation of the effect of self-selection of auditor on audit fees, see Chaney et al., 2004. 
8To estimate the choice of auditor, we have used an adaptation of the model proposed by Hamilton et 
al. (2008): BIG4 = -8.97 + 0.52*LTA - 0.97*LTDTA - 0.00*LIQ + 0.30*FOREIGN_OP - 
0.20*LOSS_2C + 0.51*NPTA + 0.14*PREV_OPINION - 0.13*CATA (Pseudo R2 = 0.306, Chi2 = 
43.82, significant with a p-value <0.000), where BIG4, as well as the variable PREMIUM, has a value 
of 1 if the company is audited by a Big Four auditor, and 0 when it is not; LTDTA represents the book 
value of indebtedness in the long term with respect to the total assets of the company, LOSS_2C is a 
dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the company has experienced losses for two 
consecutive years, 0 if it has not; PREV_OPINION is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 
when the opinion of auditors was not favorable in the previous year, and 0 in all other cases; CATA is 
the value of current assets with respect to total assets of the company. The other variables are defined 
in Table 1. 
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The results obtained remain robust after controlling for self-selection bias (Table 9, panel 
A). The Big Four accounting firms charge higher prices than other firms, and the ability to 
collude derived from the level of concentration, the existence of entry barriers, and market 
mobility does not affect the obtainment of these audit fee premiums. Therefore, in light of these 
analyses, audit fee premiums are not explained by the exercise of market power by the Big 
Four accounting firms. 
(INSERT TABLE 9) 
Panel Data Analysis 
It is possible that the fees charged for audit services, in addition to the factors already 
considered in the model, may be explained by characteristics of the audited companies that 
remain constant over time but are not observable, such as the ability to negotiate with the 
audit firm, managers' interest in the quality of accounting information, etc. Panel data analysis 
allows detection of this unobservable heterogeneity that may explain decisions about fees, 
thus providing more efficient estimators than ordinary regression (Jara-Bertín and López-
Iturriaga 2007). This technique also allows corroboration of whether there are endogeneity 
problems in the rest of the variables considered in the model. To that end, we repeated the 
analyses of Table 6, estimating a dynamic linear model using the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) and the system estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1998). This 
dynamic model includes the delay of the dependent variable (AFEE_1) in the model as an 
explanatory variable, which means observing that the fees for one year are partly determined 
by the audit fees established in the previous year. This is consistent with the contract structure 
in the audit market, which allows negotiating contracts for three or more years. 
The results obtained by these means are qualitatively similar to the previous ones (Table 
9, panel B), thus confirming that audit fee premiums of the Big Four accounting firms do not 
seem to be due to their ability to exercise market power. 
Consideration of Non-Audit Services 
Some studies have observed interdependencies between audit fees and fees charged for 
additional services to the same clients (Simunic 1984; Palmrose 1986). Methodologically, this 
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fact can cause a specification problem in the model. We repeated the analysis of Table 8, 
panel B. The logarithm of fees received for additional services provided to audit clients was 
used as an explanatory variable (LNAS). The results do not differ qualitatively from the 
previous ones (Table 9, panel C). 
Extreme Observations 
Finally, we have verified whether our results are affected by the existence of extreme 
observations. To that end, we have analyzed the extreme values of the variables NPTA, LIQ, 
TDTA, RECTA, and INVTA and replaced them with the maximum value of their average +/- 
three times their standard deviation. This way, we made sure that the models are well specified 
and statistically valid (Hamilton et al. 2008). The results (Table 9, panel D) remain robust. 
Consequently, we are able to determine that our conclusions are unaffected by the existence 
of extreme observations. 
CONCLUSIONS 
At international level, there is a great interest in the nature and intensity of competition in 
the audit market and, in particular, the possible existence of certain anti-competitive practices, 
which may be motivated by particular structural characteristics of the market. Indeed, an 
important number of studies worldwide have emphasized that the audit market is controlled 
by the Big Four accounting firms. In other words, this market exhibits high levels of 
concentration, which, together with the apparent existence of entry barriers, makes it easier 
for these leading firms to perform certain behaviors that, by affecting the general welfare, 
jointly favor their private interests. One type of anti-competitive behavior, for example, is when 
Big Four auditors impose higher prices than would prevail in a competitive market. This fact 
has aroused much interest among both academia and regulators because, by those means, 
the Big Four accounting firms exercise market power. 
In this sense, analysis of the price behavior exhibited by leading companies allows 
assessment of the nature of competition in a market—i.e., the level of imperfection with which 
a market may actually be operating and, therefore, the need to promote corrective measures 
in order to deal with imperfections, such as the exercise of market power. In this way, the 
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objective of the present study was to assess the nature of competition in the Spanish audit 
market through an analysis of the price behavior of the Big Four accounting firms. In this 
regard, we assessed whether audit fee premiums could be explained by a lack of competitors 
and the high control that these firms can exercise over the market. This issue is extremely 
important, because there may be alternative explanations that could clarify the existence of 
audit fee premiums—for example, the market perceives that the Big Four accounting firms 
offer higher quality services than other suppliers. In short, there may be a differentiated 
demand for quality in the market, which means that not all suppliers are perfect substitutes. 
To this end, the methodology used in the literature on the audit market has basically 
consisted of segmenting the market according to its level of competition, distinguishing a 
section with less competition from another with more competition. This methodology is based 
on the assumption that if the Big Four accounting firms exercise market power, they can only 
impose higher prices than other suppliers in a market that they control and which is less 
competitive. On the other hand, in markets with greater competition, the Big Four accounting 
firms have to operate like other suppliers—i.e., as price accepters. However, if, irrespective of 
the level of competition in the market, the Big Four accounting firms manage to obtain higher 
prices in both market segments, it could be due to the fact that the clients perceive that these 
firms offer higher quality services. 
In contrast to previous studies (Simunic 1980; Francis 1984; Francis and Stokes 1986; 
Johnson et al. 1995; Chen et al. 1993; Gul 1999; Carson et al. 2004; Cameran, 2005; Chen 
et al. 2007; Hamilton et al. 2008), we used in the present study the standard audit fee model 
and, through the inclusion of an interaction term, directly assessed whether the obtainment of 
audit fee premiums by the Big Four auditors was conditioned by the level of market 
competition. As a complement to this methodology, and to detect the impact of market 
competition on the Big Four premium, the model developed by Carson et al. (2012) was used. 
In order to measure the level of competition, we used two structural characteristics of the 
market, namely concentration and entry barriers. The theory of industrial organization 
considers these two issues determining elements of the level of competition in a market. The 
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higher the level of market concentration and entry barriers, the more potential control can be 
achieved by market leaders, thus making the exercise of market power more feasible. We also 
included the absolute variation in market shares as a dynamic measure of competition. These 
types of index introduce measures of market stability or instability (Baldwin and Gorecki 1989). 
This way, the transfer of market shares from the losers to the winning companies will be 
observed in a market with a vigorous competitive process between the leading companies. 
The results obtained in the present study indicated firstly that the prices charged by the 
Big Four accounting firms were higher than those charged by other suppliers in the market. 
Secondly, these audit fee premiums were not explained by the level of market competition, 
whether measured through the level of concentration, the existence of entry barriers, or market 
mobility. This seems to suggest that clients perceive that these firms offer quality-differentiated 
audit services for which higher prices should be paid. 
This evidence is relevant because it allows the inference that the Big Four accounting 
firms do not engage in anti-competitive behavior, such as market power, in the Spanish audit 
market, even though there are entry barriers and high concentration that could reduce the 
level of competition. From regulators’ point of view, this evidence would imply that there is no 
apparent need to intervene in the market, given that there is no lack of competition. This way, 
no interventionist measures are required to reduce concentration and entry barriers, or to 
promote mobility. On the other hand, and for the other competitors in the market, the evidence 
obtained in the present study reveals that the basis of competition is perceived quality, which 
implies that these firms should make efforts to increase their perceived service quality in favor 
of other types of strategy such as cost reduction. 
The findings of this study are also of special interest since the study verifies the 
robustness of the premium after controlling for self-selection, which, according to Hay and 
Knechel (2017) ,will be of great value for the development of future meta-analysis to assess 
whether the premium is different after controlling for self-selection. 
However, our results have certain limitations and, for this reason, the conclusions should 
be taken into consideration with caution. Firstly, our data refer to the Spanish audit market and 
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the conclusions may not be applied in other contexts. We focused on analyzing the pricing 
behavior of listed companies, which were considered to be of public interest and among which 
there is apparently less competition. However, this behavior could be different in the market 
of unlisted companies. From this perspective, it would be interesting to extend this analysis to 
the market of unlisted companies in further studies. Thirdly, the present study assessed the 
period 2003–2010. However, it is worth mentioning that a number of events took place after 
2010, such as Directive 2014/56/UE, Regulation (UE) No. 537/2014, and the Spanish Audit 
Law 22/2015, which may have affected the level of competition in the Spanish audit market. 
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TABLE 1 
Variable definition 
 
 
Variables  
Expected 
sign  Definition 
 Dependent variable   
 AFEE  Natural logarithm of the audit fees 
 Test variables   
 
PREMIUM + 
1 when the auditor is a Big Four firm, 0 
otherwise 
 C4 + Sum of the market shares of the four major 
international firms per year and industry  
 SUPPLIERS - Number of suppliers per year and industry 
 
MOBILITY - 
Sum of the absolute value of changes in market 
share of firms by activity sector over time 
 Control variables   
 LTA + Natural logarithm of the auditee’s total assets 
 
NPTA - 
Return on assets measured as the net profit over 
total assets 
 
LOSS + 
1 if the company has negative results on 
ordinary activities of audited financial year, 0 
otherwise 
 
LIQ - 
Acid test (current assets minus stock, deflated by 
current liabilities) 
 TDTA + Debt ratio (total debt over total assets) 
 
RECTA + 
Book value of the accounts receivable with 
respect to the total firm assets in that tax year 
 
INVTA + 
Book value of the inventories with respect to the 
total firm assets in that tax year 
 
NEW +/- 
1 if the audit is performed by a newly appointed 
audit firm, 0 otherwise 
 
OPINION + 
1 if the company received a qualified opinion in 
the current year, 0 otherwise 
 FOREIGN_OP + 1 if the firm has operations abroad, 0 otherwise 
 SUBSIDIARIES + Square root of the firm’s number of subsidiaries 
 
INDUSTRY  
Sector in which the firm operates, taken from the 
sector classification of the Madrid Stock 
Exchange (13 sectors) 
 
YEAR  
Dummy variables capturing each year in our 
analysis 
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TABLE 2 
Industry distribution of the final sample 
 
Industry\Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
S1 14 15 14 14 17 15 13 12 114 
S2 19 18 18 17 16 14 13 12 127 
S3 10 10 10 9 9 10 8 8 74 
S4 5 5 5 7 7 7 7 8 51 
S5 17 15 15 14 14 14 12 13 114 
S6 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 5 50 
S7 10 9 8 8 8 7 7 7 64 
S8 4 5 5 5 7 7 7 7 47 
S9 4 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 21 
S10 5 5 4 5 6 5 5 5 40 
S11 9 9 7 7 9 7 7 7 62 
S12 8 6 5 5 6 6 6 6 48 
S13 30 26 24 22 24 24 22 22 194 
Total 142 132 124 121 131 125 116 115 1006 
Industry classification: S1: Oil and energy; S2: Minerals; S3: Construction; S4: Chemicals; S5: Food and 
beverage; S6: Textiles, clothing, and footwear; S7: Paper, printing, and others; S8: Products pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology; S9: Leisure, tourism, and hospitality; S10: Communication; S11: Transport; S12: Technology; 
S13: Real estate. 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive statistics (n=1006) 
 
Variables  Mean  Median  STD.  Min.  Max. 
Panel A: Continuous variables    
AUDIT FEES (Euros) 193,603.3 65,000 546,044.5 1,500 6,983,000 
AFEE 11.09 11.08 1.36 7.31 15.76 
C4 0.93 0.95 0.08 0.62 1 
SUPPLIERS 6.47 5 3.60 2 18 
MOBILITY 0.23 0.12 0.25 0.02 1.54 
LTA 19.58 19.40 1.96 14.77 25.26 
NPTA 0.03 0.04 0.14 -1.88 0.73 
LIQ 10.57 0.92 122.44 0.01 3,484.12 
TDTA 0.51 0.53 0.28 0.00 2.92 
RECTA 0.14 0.09 0.15 0 0.73 
INVTA 0.11 0.02 0.17 0 0.97 
SUBSIDIARIES 3.47 3.16 2.37 0 24.62 
Panel B: Categorial variables    
PREMIUM 0.79 1 0.41   
LOSS 0.28 0 0.45   
NEW 0.08 0 0.27   
OPINION 0.16 0 0.36   
FOREIGN_OP 0.56 1 0.50   
Variables are defined in Table 1.      
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TABLE 4  
Mean values by industry of the number of suppliers, concentration, market share 
variation, and audit fees 
 
Industry  Suppliers  Concentration  Mobility  Audit Fees 
S1 6.65 99% 0.32 775,336 
S2 6.05 98% 0.11 111,469 
S3 2.89 100% 0.09 135,475 
S4 4.55 79% 0.33 134,566 
S5 6.71 92%  0.24 82,503 
S6 4.86 89% 0.29 118,897 
S7 4.88 93% 0.17 64,922 
S8 4.11 97% 0.34 109,878 
S9 2 100% 0.31 190,314 
S10 2.63 93% 0.21 199,413 
S11 5.13 98% 0.23 105,195 
S12 3.65 100% 0.25 411,867 
S13 12.30 82% 0.25 63,906 
Nonparametric test   
805.45 
(0.0001) 
795.33 
(0.0001) 
116.36 
(0.0001) 
177.18 
(0.0001) 
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TABLE 5 
Pearson correlation matrix 
 
   V1: (AFEE)  V2  V3  V4  V5  V6  V7  V8  V9  V10  V11  V12  V13  V14  V15 
V2: PREMIUM 0.52**               
V3: C4 0.33** 0.33**              
V4: SUPPLIERS -0.38** -0.35** -0.62**             
V5: MOBILITY 0.06 -0.001 0.05 0.01            
V6: LTA 0.81** 0.47** 0.25** -0.25** 0.03           
V7: NPTA 0.05 0.6** 0.12** -0.06* -0.05 0.12**          
V8: LOSS 0.05 -0.08* 0.02 -0.12** 0.04 0.02 -0.43**         
V9: LIQ 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.001 0.01 0.05        
V10: TDTA 0.28** 0.15** -0.003 -0.11** -0.03 0.37** -0.31** 0.17** -0.12**       
V11: RECTA 0.08** 0.07* 0.08* -0.15** -0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.17** -0.06 0.24**      
V12: INVTA -0.11** -0.10** -0.26** 0.30** 0.01 -0.13** -0.10** 0.09** -0.05 0.14** 0.10**     
V13: NEW -0.13** -0.11** -0.09** 0.10** 0.11** -0.10** -0.08** 0.07* -0.1 -0.003 -0.02 0.05    
V14: OPINION -0.06 -0.07* -0.06 0.08* 0.07* -0.12** -0.28** 0018** -0.02 0.12** -0.06 0.17** 0.06   
V15: FOREIGN_OP 0.31** 0.19** 0.26** -0.40** -0.157 0.18** 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.10** 0.28** -0.08* -0.01 -0.09**  
V16: SUBSIDIARIES 0.52** 0.30** 0.16** -0.25** -0.01 0.60** 0.08* 0.01 -0.02 0.24** 0.04 -0.13** -0.06* -0.12** 0.21** 
Variables are defined in Table 1. *,**Significant at 0.05 and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). 
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TABLE 6 
Linear regression analysis between audit fees and fee premium and market 
competition 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables  
Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 
Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 
Coef. 
(t-Stat) 
 
Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 
Coef. 
(t-Stat) 
Test variables       
PREMIUM 0.44 
(4.53)*** 
0.44 
(4.49)*** 
0.57 
(3.83)*** 
0.42 
(4.32)*** 
0.57 
(3.74)*** 
PREMIUM*C4a  0.11 
(0.19) 
  -0.31 
(-0.44) 
PREMIUM*SUPPLIERS   -0.02 
(-1.03) 
 -0.02 
(-1.13) 
PREMIUM*MOBILITY    0.06 
(0.75) 
0.06 
(0.75) 
Control variables      
LTA 0.49 
(10.25)*** 
0.49 
(10.25)*** 
0.49 
(10.24)*** 
0.49 
(10.24)*** 
0.49 
(10.26)*** 
NPTA -0.79 
(-3.08)*** 
-0.79 
(-3.08)*** 
-0.80 
(-3.14)*** 
-0.79 
(-3.06)*** 
-0.80 
(-3.12)*** 
LOSS 0.02 
(0.35) 
0.02 
(0.35) 
0.03 
(0.37) 
0.02 
(0.34) 
0.02 
(0.36) 
LIQ 0.00 
(0.91) 
0.00 
(0.92) 
0.00 
(0.88) 
0.00 
(0.91) 
0.00 
(0.87) 
TDTA -0.38 
(-2.29)** 
-0.38 
(-2.28)** 
-0.37 
(-2.28)** 
-0.37 
(-2.28)** 
-0.37 
(-2.27)** 
RECTA 0.73 
(2.39)** 
0.73 
(2.39)** 
0.74 
(2.40)** 
0.73 
(2.39)** 
0.74 
(2.41)** 
INVTA 0.26 
(1.13) 
0.27 
(1.13) 
0.27 
(1.17) 
0.26 
(1.13) 
0.27 
(1.17) 
NEW -0.19 
(-2.19)** 
-0.19 
(-2.20)** 
-0.19 
(-2.20)** 
-0.18 
(-2.23)** 
-0.19 
(-2.23)** 
OPINION 0.17 
(2.08)** 
0.17 
(2.08)** 
0.16 
(2.01)** 
0.17 
(2.08)** 
0.17 
(2.03)** 
FOREIGN_OP 0.18 
(1.84)* 
0.18 
(1.84)* 
0.18 
(1.82)* 
0.18 
(1.83)* 
0.18 
(1.84)* 
SUBSIDIARIES 0.04 
(1.13) 
0.04 
(1.13) 
0.04 
(1.12) 
0.04 
(1.13) 
0.04 
(1.12) 
Intercept 0.70 
(0.89) 
0.70 
(0.89) 
0.88 
(1.11) 
0.70 
(0.89) 
0.88 
(1.11) 
INDUSTRY EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
Statistical F 36.06*** 35.00*** 35.14*** 35.20*** 33.14*** 
Observations 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 
Cluster (company) 170 170 170 170 170 
Mean VIF 1.65 1.77 2.10 1.65 2.21 
Variables are defined in Table 1. a Variable C4 mean-centered to calculate the interaction term (Bruynseels and Willekens 
2012); *,**,*** statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 7 
Robustness tests: linear regression analysis between audit fees and fee premium and 
market competition 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Variables  
Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 
Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 
Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 
Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
Test variables      
PREMIUM 0.53 
(3.87)*** 
0.45 
(4.40)*** 
0.50 
(3.28)*** 
0.52 
(3.39)*** 
PREMIUM*H -0.22 
(-0.85) 
  -0.43 
(-0.90) 
PREMIUM* MINSIZEa  0.01 
(0.09) 
 0.03 
(0.32) 
PREMIUM* GINI   -0.12 
(-0.50) 
0.18 
(0.46) 
Control variables      
LTA 0.49 
(10.26)*** 
0.49 
(10.28)*** 
0.49 
(10.25)*** 
0.49 
(10.28)*** 
NPTA -0.78 
(-3.02)*** 
-0.78 
(-3.09)*** 
-0.78 
(-3.05)*** 
-0.77 
(-3.01)*** 
LOSS 0.03 
(0.37) 
0.02 
(0.34) 
0.03 
(0.37) 
0.02 
(0.33) 
LIQ 0.00 
(0.92) 
0.00 
(0.91) 
0.00 
(0.91) 
0.00 
(0.94) 
TDTA -0.37 
(-2.25)** 
-0.38 
(-2.26)** 
-0.37 
(-2.28)** 
-0.36 
(-2.18)** 
RECTA 0.73 
(2.39)** 
0.73 
(2.39)** 
0.74 
(2.39)** 
0.73 
(2.35)** 
INVTA 0.26 
(1.11) 
0.26 
(1.12) 
0.26 
(1.12) 
0.26 
(1.11) 
NEW -0.18 
(-2.20)** 
-0.19 
(-2.19)** 
0.18 
(-2.19)** 
-0.18 
(-2.20)** 
OPINION 0.18 
(2.12)** 
0.17 
(2.08)** 
0.17 
(2.09)** 
0.17 
(2.10)** 
FOREIGN_OP 0.18 
(1.82)* 
0.18 
(1.83)* 
0.18 
(1.84)* 
0.18 
(1.78)* 
SUBSIDIARIES 0.04 
(1.11) 
0.04 
(1.14) 
0.04 
(1.12) 
0.04 
(1.11) 
Intercept 0.69 
(0.87) 
0.89 
(1.13) 
0.69 
(0.88) 
0.90 
(1.14) 
INDUSTRY EFFECTS YES YES YES YES 
YEAR EFFECTS YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
Statistical F 35.44*** 35.12*** 35.12*** 33.52*** 
Observations 1006 1006 1006 1006 
Cluster (company) 170 170 170 170 
Mean VIF 2.08 1.99 2.12 4.01 
H: Herfindahl index measured as the sum of squared market shares of all audit firms in the market per year and industry. 
MINSIZE: Efficient minimum size of each market measured as the average natural logarithm of the auditee’s total assets 
per year and industry. GINI: measured as: 
it
tn
i
t
tt
t X
n
i
Xn
Gini ,
,
1
2 2
12 



 

 



 
where n is equal to the number of competitors in the market at a given moment in time, t
X  is equal to the average market 
share of all competitors, and X t, i is equal to the market share of each of the competitors. The remaining variables are 
defined in Table 1. a Variable MINSIZE mean-centered to calculate the interaction term (Bruynseels and Willekens 2012); 
*,**,*** statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 8 
Robustness tests: alternative estimation of the Big Four premium 
 
Panel A: Linear regression analysis of the non-Big Four audit fee model 
 
LTA  NPTA  LOSS  LIQ  TDTA  RECTA  INVTA  NEW  OPINION  
FOREIGN_
OP  SUBSIDIARIES  Intercept 
Coef. 
(t-Stat) 
0.51 
(10.33)*** 
-1.20 
(-2.82)*** 
0.22 
(1.76)* 
-0.001 
(-3.40)*** 
-0.65 
(-2.28)** 
0.77 
(1.47) 
0.40 
(1.44) 
-0.10 
(-0.98) 
0.27 
(1.81)* 
0.47 
(3.15)*** 
0.09 
(1.53) 
0.37 
(0.46) 
INDUSTRY EFFECTS YES 
YEAR EFFECTS YES 
R2 0.84 
Statistical F 141.90*** 
Observations (Cluster - company) 215 (47) 
Mean VIF 1.76 
Panel B: Linear regression analysis between Big Four premium and market competition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables  
Coef. 
(t-Stat) 
 
Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 
Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 
Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 Coef. 
(t-Stat) 
Test variables          
C4 0.70 
(1.35) 
  0.41 
(0.97) 
    
SUPPLIERS  -0.02 
(-0.90) 
 -0.02 
(-0.69) 
    
MOBILITY   0.10 
(1.24) 
0.08 
(1.00) 
    
H     -0.09 
(-0.32) 
  -0.14 
(-0.28) 
MINSIZE      -0.06 
(-0.50) 
 -0.05 
(-0.46) 
GINI       -0.04 
(-0.16) 
0.06 
(0.15) 
 (continued on next page) 
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TABLE 8 (continued) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables  
Coef. 
(t-Stat) 
 
Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 
Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 
Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 Coef. 
(t-Stat) 
Control variables          
LTA -0.05 
(-0.91) 
-0.05 
(-0.91) 
-0.05 
(-0.90) 
-0.05 
(-0.91) 
-0.05 
(-0.90) 
-0.05 
(-0.89) 
-0.05 
(-0.90) 
-0.05 
(-0.89) 
NPTA 0.72 
(2.33)** 
0.71 
(2.31)** 
0.73 
(2.40)** 
0.72 
(2.32)** 
0.74 
(2.98)** 
0.73 
(2.38)** 
0.73 
(2.37)** 
0.74 
(2.39)** 
LOSS -0.17 
(-2.05)** 
-0.17 
(-2.03)** 
-0.16 
(-2.00)** 
-0.17 
(-2.04)** 
-0.16 
(-1.99)** 
-0.15 
(-1.91)* 
-0.16 
(-2.00)** 
-0.15 
(-1.90)* 
LIQ 0.00 
(20.55)*** 
0.00 
(20.25)*** 
0.00 
(20.73)*** 
0.00 
(20.33)*** 
0.00 
(20.63)*** 
0.00 
(20.70)*** 
0.00 
(20.58)*** 
0.00 
(20.60)*** 
TDTA 0.40 
(2.08)** 
0.40 
(2.07)** 
0.41 
(2.10)** 
0.41 
(2.08)** 
0.41 
(2.09)** 
0.41 
(2.08)** 
0.41 
(2.09)** 
0.41 
(2.08)** 
RECTA -0.07 
(-0.21) 
-0.08 
(-0.22) 
-0.08 
(-0.23) 
-0.07 
(-0.22) 
-0.08 
(-0.22) 
-0.08 
(-0.22) 
-0.08 
(-0.22) 
-0.08 
(-0.23) 
INVTA -0.35 
(-1.01) 
-0.36 
(-1.03) 
-0.34 
(-0.99) 
-0.36 
(-1.02) 
-0.35 
(-1.01) 
-0.34 
(-0.97) 
-0.35 
(-1.01) 
-0.34 
(-0.97) 
NEW -0.18 
(-1.48) 
-0.18 
(-1.45) 
-0.19 
(-1.57) 
-0.19 
(-1.52) 
-0.18 
(-1.49) 
-0.19 
(-1.49) 
-0.18 
(-1.48) 
-0.19 
(-1.49) 
OPINION -0.19 
(-1.87)* 
-0.19 
(-1.90)* 
-0.18 
(-1.84)* 
-0.19 
(-1.90)* 
-0.18 
(-1.82)* 
-0.18 
(-1.81)* 
-0.18 
(-1.81)* 
-0.18 
(-1.75)* 
FOREIGN_OP -0.29 
(-2.43)** 
-0.29 
(-2.39)** 
-0.29 
(-2.42)** 
-0.29 
(-2.42)** 
-0.29 
(-2.40)** 
-0.29 
(-2.41)** 
-0.29 
(-2.39)** 
-0.29 
(-2.40)** 
SUBSIDIARIES -0.04 
(-1.08) 
-0.04 
(-1.08) 
-0.04 
(1.07) 
-0.04 
(-1.08) 
-0.04 
(-1.08) 
-0.04 
(-1.07) 
-0.04 
(-1.08) 
-0.04 
(-1.07) 
Intercept 0.47 
(0.44) 
1.32 
(1.19) 
1.00 
(0.99) 
0.88 
(0.78) 
1.07 
(1.05) 
2.03 
(0.95) 
1.06 
(1.03) 
1.98 
(0.91) 
INDUSTRY EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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TABLE 8 (continued) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
R2 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 
Statistical F 409.22*** 402.49*** 307.85*** 426.40*** 311.80*** 273.57*** 324.84*** 258.05*** 
Observations 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 
Cluster (company) 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 
Mean VIF 2.16 2.98 1.73 3.13 1.93 3.22 1.89 3.96 
*,**,*** Statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 9 
Synthesis of additional analysis 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables  
Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 
Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 
Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 
Coef. 
(t-Stat) 
Panel A: Self-selection bias     
PREMIUM 
0.43 
(4.43)*** 
0.54 
(3.59)*** 
0.43 
(4.33)*** 
0.53 
(3.56)*** 
PREMIUM *C4a 
-0.04 
(-0.06) 
  
-0.41 
(-0.62) 
PREMIUM * SUPPLIERS  
-0.01 
(-0.79) 
 
-0.02 
(-1.01) 
PREMIUM * MOBILITY   
0.03 
(0.43) 
0.04 
(0.51) 
IMR 
0.07 
(0.27) 
0.07 
(0.25) 
0.07 
(0.27) 
0.05 
(0.2) 
R2 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
F-statistic 32.93*** 32.96*** 32.99*** 31.23*** 
Panel B: Panel data analysis  
PREMIUM 
0.42 
(2.53)** 
0.71 
(2.23)** 
0.39 
(2.75)*** 
0.68 
(2.26)** 
PREMIUM *C4a 
0.17 
(0.37) 
  
-0.38 
(-0.78) 
PREMIUM * SUPPLIERS  
-0.04 
(-1.46) 
 
-0.04 
(-1.50) 
PREMIUM * MOBILITY   
0.03 
(0.49) 
0.04 
(0.63) 
AFEE_1 0.60 
(6.94)*** 
0.61 
(7.30)*** 
0.61 
(6.49)*** 
0.61 
(7.36)*** 
Z1 115.74 (26)*** 118.21 (26)*** 122.74 (26)*** 114.78 (28)*** 
Z2 2.04 (7)* 1.80 (7)* 2.09 (7)** 2.02 (7)* 
m1 -3.42 -3.49 -3.40 -3.52 
m2 -0.38 -0.33 -0.39 -0.33 
Hansen-Chi2 (gl) 62.97 (55) 58.74 (55) 62.86 (55) 58.62 (55) 
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TABLE 9 (continued) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables  
Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 
Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 
Coef.  
(t-Stat) 
 
Coef. 
(t-Stat) 
Panel C: Consideration of non-audit services 
PREMIUM 0.45 
(2.44)** 
0.71 
(2.55)** 
0.43 
(2.53)** 
0.71 
(2.51)** 
PREMIUM *C4a 0.09 
(0.23) 
  
-0.38 
(-0.96) 
PREMIUM * 
SUPPLIERS 
 
-0.04 
(-1.53) 
 
-0.04 
(-1.59) 
PREMIUM * 
MOBILITY 
  
0.03 
(0.33) 
0.03 
(0.42) 
AFEE_1 0.59 
(7.10)*** 
0.59 
(7.47)*** 
0.59 
(7.00)*** 
0.59 
(7.39)*** 
LNAS 
0.01 
(1.44) 
0.01 
(1.62) 
0.01 
(1.44) 
0.01 
(1.63) 
Z1 94.52 (27)*** 96.12 (27)*** 
100.12 
(27)*** 
94.94 (29)*** 
Z2 1.77 (7)* 1.61 (7) 1.86 (7)* 1.96 (7)* 
m1 -3.32 -3.36 -3.33 -3.39 
m2 -0.26 -0.19 -0.26 -0.19 
Hansen-Chi2 (gl) 70.48 (69) 71.95 (69) 70.68 (69) 72.00 (69) 
Panel D: Extreme observations 
PREMIUM 0.41 
(4.07)*** 
0.55 
(3.70)*** 
0.41 
(4.14)*** 
0.54 
(3.47)*** 
PREMIUM *C4a -0.12 
(-0.18) 
  
-0.49 
(-0.69) 
PREMIUM * 
SUPPLIERS 
 
-0.02 
(-0.98) 
 
-0.02 
(-1.00) 
PREMIUM * 
MOBILITY  
  
0.06 
(0.76) 
0.04 
(0.53) 
R2 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
F-statistic 
37.27*** 37.94*** 38.53*** 34.75*** 
Variables are defined in Table 1. a Variable C4 mean-centered to calculate the interaction term (Bruynseels and Willekens 
2012); *,**,*** statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
